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Abstract 
This paper assesses the short-term impact of product market deregulation in upstream sectors on 
the productivity of firms in downstream sectors (i.e. those firms using the output of the reformed 
sectors as inputs in their production process). Relying on a firm level database for the period 2004-
2014 covering all Portuguese firms, we show that the most productive firms (those at the sectoral 
technological frontier) grasp short-run benefits from these reforms, which are then spread to all 
other firms via spillover mechanisms.  In addition, reforms potentiate the exit of the least 
productive firms, improving the resource allocation in the economy. Finally, we show that the 
adoption of product market reforms in upstream sectors leads to a more resilient economy, better 
equipped to face adverse shocks. 
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1 Introduction  
In recent years, Portugal implemented a large number of structural policies aimed at increasing 
productivity and improving resilience to shocks. Reforms covered many areas, such as the labour 
market, education and skills, the judicial and fiscal systems and several product market 
frameworks.  
Product market reforms were a key area, given the dimension of the pre-existing challenges and 
the expected payoffs.1 In 2008, Portugal ranked 26th out of 34th countries in the OECD Product 
Market Regulation, which assesses the degree of flexibility in the sector.2 In this context, the 
product market reform agenda was exhaustive and includes: liberalization of gas and electricity 
markets, with the phasing out of regulated tariffs; negotiations with energy producers to reduce 
rents and eliminate the tariff debt; creation of a transports regulator; reduction of ports operating 
costs; a new telecommunications regulatory framework, including the reduction of termination 
rates and lower restrictions on customers mobility; a competition enhancing framework in the 
postal sector; several steps in the direction of the liberalisation of  19 regulated professions. A 
number of overarching measures such as the revision of the competition law and improved 
enforcement (e.g. with the creation of specialized courts) and the elimination of State special rights 
in private companies were also adapted. These measures, aimed at fostering competition, and 
reducing the excessive rents of sheltered sectors, allowing for a more efficient resource allocation, 
increased productivity levels and enhanced resilience to shocks. As a consequence, between 2008 
and 2013, Portugal climbed 14 places in the OECD’s Product Market Regulation ranking, and 
reached the 12th position. 
                                                          
1 Several studies show that product market reforms produce the largest economic gains when compared to other reforms (see, for 
instance Égert and Gal, 2016 and Barnes et al, 2013).  




The Office for Economic Policy and International Affairs (GPEARI) of the Portuguese Ministry 
of Finance is mandated to assess the ex-ante and ex-post macroeconomic impact of structural 
reforms. This project is part of a partnership between the GPEARI and Nova SBE to develop 
analytical work in this context. By using firm-level data from 2004 to 2014 and the OECD’s PMR 
indicators, we assess the impact of the liberalization of product markets in Portugal on firms’ 
productivity, reallocation of resources and resilience to shocks. In particular, we consider the effect 
of deregulation of product market sectors in downstream industries, i.e. on firms using these 
markets’ output as input to their production process. This is possible due to a newly available 
OECD dataset relying on input-output matrices (Égert and Wanner, 2016).  
Given that the reforms are recent and our available firm-level time series are relatively short, we 
focus mainly on short-run effects. This is particularly relevant for the political economy of the 
reform process, as its potential short-term costs, if not well communicated and properly addressed, 
may undermine support and promote reform fatigue. In fact, while long-term gains of product 
market reforms are well established (see e.g. IMF, 2015 and OECD, 2015), they may take some 
years to materialize and even be negative in the short-run. Lower rents lead to the exit of incumbent 
firms (while firm entry occurs only in the medium-term), thus contracting aggregate supply and 
increasing unemployment, which in turn reduces aggregate demand. In addition, innovating firms 
have immediate costs but only longer-term (uncertain) gains. Aggregate demand may also contract 
in the short-run if reforms increase agents’ uncertainty, leading them to higher savings and less 
consumption.  
We provide the following contributions. Firstly, we analyse the short-term impact of reforms, 
showing that deregulation in upstream sectors increases productivity growth for the most 
productive firms (those at the technological frontier), but not for the others (the so-called laggards). 
However, the laggards benefit from second round effects, as we also show that there are spillovers 
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from frontier firms to the others, both via diffusion and catching up mechanisms. The short-run 
effects of reforms are heterogeneous across sectors, possibly due to different competitiveness 
structures and the position over the cycle.3 
Secondly, we assess how the reforms affect firms’ exit and resilience to shocks. Using a probit 
model, we show that less productive firms are more prone to exiting the market under a more 
flexible regulatory setting. Relying on a difference-in-differences estimation and comparing two 
groups of firms – one more affected by the reforms and the other not as much – we also show that 
reforms allow firms to better manage the 2011 crisis, with a lower reduction in productivity. 
This work allows for fine-tuning existing reforms and improving the design of future reforms; 
moreover, the evidence on the benefits of already enacted reforms is key in promoting ownership. 
This is particularly important in product markets, where vested interests are in general a strong 
impediment to reforms (given that costs are concentrated on a small number of stakeholders, while 
gains are diffuse).  
The work project proceeds as follows: Section 2 explores the most relevant literature, and Section 
3 introduces the database and the variables. We present the methodology in Section 4 and the 
empirical results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2 Literature Review 
The long-run positive impact of product market reforms on productivity and growth is a well-
established result both in model-based literature (Arpaia et al. 2007; Everaert and Schule, 2008; 
Andrés, Arce and Thomas, 2014; IMF, 2016) and in econometric studies relying on aggregate, 
                                                          
3 For instance, the impact on hotels and restaurants is overall positive, which may be due to the competitive pressures that were 
introduced in the sector. A higher output-price elasticity implies that price reductions translate into higher output. Conversely, in 
the construction sector the effects are overall negative, since, as described in the literature, short-term costs of reforms are amplified 
during downturns (that particularly affected the construction sector). 
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sectoral and firm-level data (Égert and Gal, 2016; Arnold and Barbosa, 2015; Barnes et al., 2013; 
Bouis and Duval, 2011; Bouis et al. 2012; IMF, 2015; and OECD, 2015).  
However, model-based simulations show that these long-term gains may come after short-run 
costs, particularly at the lower bound zero interest rate (Eggertsson et al., 2013), in small open 
economies (Cacciatore et al., 2016) or during downturns (IMF, 2016). The empirical evidence on 
short-run impacts is mixed. For instance, while Cacciatore and Fiore (2015) and Bouis et al. (2012), 
using aggregate data for a set of OECD countries, find evidence of these costs, Gal and Hijzen 
(2016), using firm-level data for 18 advanced economies, and Barone and Cingano (2011), using 
industry-level data for a set of OECD countries, show that gains are visible already in the short-
run. Firm-level national studies, such as Forlani (2012) for France, and Lanau and Topalova (2016) 
for Italy, also provide evidence of short-term gains. 
These results suggest that contextual factors are important in determining the sign of short run 
effects. The literature using aggregate (Adhikari et al., 2016, Bouis et al., 2012, Égert and Gal, 
2016), sectoral (Nicoletti and Scarpeta, 2003, Dabla-Norris et al., 2015, Gal and Hijzen, 2016) and 
firm-level data (Santos et al., 2017, IMF, 2016, Bourles et al., 2013), show that (i) the economic 
cycle, (ii) technological spillovers, (iii) sectoral differences, (iv) firm productivity and (v) initial 
framework conditions and interactions with other reforms may explain these differences.4  
Overall, product market reforms increase regulatory flexibility and reduce entry barriers, 
potentiating a reduction of mark-ups and increased churn-rates. The first effect was already studied 
for the Portuguese economy (Amador and Soares, 2013 and Folque, 2016). For churn rates, existing 
literature shows that product market reforms potentiate firm entry and exit (Cincera and Galgau, 
                                                          
4 The literature assesses the impact of reforms through their direct effect on regulated upstream sectors, such as electricity, gas or 
telecommunications (e.g. Gal and Hijzen, 2016, Lanau and Topalova, 2016) or via indirect effects on downstream firms that use 
the output of upstream sectors as inputs (Barone and Cingano, 2011, Forlani, 2012, and Bourles et al., 2013).  
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2005; Schiantarelli, 2005; Lanau and Topalova, 2016 and Gal and Hijzen, 2016). This reduction in 
mark-ups and the increased churn rates improve the allocation of resources within the economy, 
fostering productivity growth.5  
In addition to higher productivity growth, product market reforms are also expected to improve the 
economy’s shock resilience, a result corroborated by Duval et al. (2007), Ernst et al. (2007) and 
Pelkmans et al. (2008) at sectoral level and by Cacciatori and Fiori (2016) at firm level. 
3  Data 
3.1. The Dataset  
We use the IES database - Informação Empresarial Simplificada (Simplified Corporate 
Information) provided by INE - Instituto Nacional de Estatística (Statistics Portugal), which 
includes the annual accounts (income statements and balance sheet) of all Portuguese firms as 
reported simultaneously to the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, Bank of Portugal and 
Statistics Portugal. Data are available from 2004 onwards.  
The initial dataset covered 3,916,315 observations for the period 2004-2014.6 To ensure 
consistency and robustness of our results, we focus on firms with positive values of assets, turnover, 
external supplies and services and with non-negative personnel expenses and number of 
employees. In addition, using the 3-digit level NACE Rev. 3, we exclude specific sectors, namely 
financial activities and insurance services, health care, entertainment, domestic staff and 
international organizations, given the specificities of their business models. With these exclusions, 
we reach a dataset of 3,199,118 observations (A similar clean-up procedures were followed for 
                                                          
5 Foster et al. (2001) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2007), using US firm-level data, show that a better resource allocation leads to 
productivity improvements. 
6 We focus solely on companies and we have thus excluded individual entrepreneurs (empresários em nome individual).  
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instance by Gal and Hijzen, 2016). Moreover, due to lack of data, we are not able to compute Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) for around 300,000 firms, leaving us with a total of 2,892,449 firms.7 
3.2. Variables  
This section describes the variables used in this study. The main performance variable is TFP, 
although we also compute Labour Productivity (LP) (output per worker), for robustness checks. 
TFP was computed using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimation method, which addresses the 
endogeneity problem arising from methods such as OLS or fixed-effects estimators.8 The 
technological frontier was defined as the firms in the 90th percentile for the estimated TFP, by year 
and sector. Firms outside the technological frontier are labelled as laggards. The distance to frontier 
is the productivity gap between laggards and frontier firms, and is computed for each laggard firm 
as the difference between its TFP level and the lower bound value of the productivity at the frontier, 
for each year and sector.  
Sectoral fixed effects are constructed using the 3-digit level NACE Rev 3.9  Region fixed effects 
are obtained with the NUT 2 Portuguese region division.10  Additionally, firm size controls are 
included. Following Statistics Portugal methodology, we constructed each firm-size bracket 
according to the conditions presented below in Table 1. 
 
                                                          
7 Please refer to Section 3.2. for detailed information about Total Factor Productivity (TFP). 
8 As the authors argue, when estimating production functions, one must account for the correlation between input levels and 
productivity, as otherwise one gets inconsistent estimates of the parameters of the production function. Therefore, they develop an 
estimator using intermediate inputs to proxy for the unobservable productivity term. To compute the TFP, we rely on the STATA  
code developed by Petrin, Poi and Levinsohn (2004), using external supplies and services as a proxy for intermediate inputs.  
9  The included sectors are Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; Mining and quarrying; Food products, beverages and tobacco; 
Wood and products of wood and cork; Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing; Coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel; Chemicals and chemical products; Rubber and plastics products; Other non-metallic mineral products; Textiles, textile 
products, leather and footwear; Basic Metals; Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment; Machinery and 
equipment n.e.c; Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; Other transport equipment; Electricity, gas and water supply; 
Construction; Transport and storage; Post and telecommunications; Real estate activities; Office, accounting and computing 
machinery; Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c; Radio, television and communication equipment; Medical, precision and 
optical instruments; Manufacturing n.e.c and recycling; Wholesale and retail trade, repairs; Hotels & Restaurants; Renting of 
machinery and equipment; Computer and related activities; Other Business Activities; Research and Development.  
10 This division includes 7 regions, covering Mainland Portugal and Islands. 
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Table 1 - Firms' Type 
Type of Firm Number of Workers   Output 
Micro <10 and <2 Million 
Small >10 and <50 and >2 Million and <10 Million 
Medium >50 and <250 and >10 Million and <50 Million 
Large >250 or >50 Million 
Source: Statistics Portugal   
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. The firms in our sample have an average of 10 workers, 
1.2 million € of output and 1.6 million € of assets. 82% of our firms are micro, 15% are small, 2% 
are medium, and 0.4% are large. Operational costs and cost of employees account for, on average, 
0.3 and 0.2 million €, respectively. Frontier firms are, on average, larger – they have a much higher 
output, their assets are more than the double of those of laggards and their number of workers is 
also higher. The average annual TFP growth is negative for laggards (-0.05%) but positive for firms 
at the frontier (+0.24%).11 
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 





Output 103 € 1,218 26,700 0 10,300,000 5,214 774 
Operational Costs 103 € 288 5,621 0 1,820,000 735 238 
Cost of employees 103 € 174 2,114 0 5,030,00 252 152 
Assets 103 € 1,586 53,500 0 21,200,000 3,051 1,423 
Number of workers unit 10 89 1 22,734 13 9 
Micro Firms unit 0.82 0.38 0 1 0.72 0.83 
Small Firms unit 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.2 0.14 
Medium Firms unit 0.02 0.15 0 1 0.06 0.02 
Large Firms unit 0.00 0.07 0 1 0.01 0 
TFP growth [∆TFP] % -0.02 0.54 -10.76 12.2 0.24 -0.05 
TFP growth of frontier [∆Frontier] % 0 0.02 -0.6 0.53 - - 
Distance to Frontier [DTF] p.p. 0.86 0.75 0 13.45 0 0.96 
Source: Author’s own computations using IES data for the years 2004-2014. N= 2.892.449 
 
    
                                                          
11 The average growth of the technological frontier is different from this value (0.00%) because we have an unbalanced sample. 
10 
 
The Regulatory Impact variable (Regimpact) is an OECD index of the potential costs of the anti-
competitive regulation in network sectors, retail distribution and professional services on 37 sectors 
of the economy that uses the output of these sectors as intermediate inputs (see Égert and Wanner, 
2016, for more information). This variable is computed by the OECD by weighing the degree of 
regulation in the non-manufacturing sectors (Regnmi) by the input-output coefficient (w) of sector 
k from the non-manufacturing sector j: 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑘,𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ∗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑤𝑗,𝑘  [1] 
We rely on the wide version of the indicator, which includes network sectors, retail distribution 
and professional services as upstream sectors, and use the narrow version, which only considers 
regulation in network sectors, for robustness purposes.12 Figure 1 shows the evolution of the wide 
indicator between 2004 and 2013.13 
 
Figure 1 – Wide Regimpact Evolution 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on IES and on OECD’s Product Market Regulation Database. 
 
The treated and control sectors used in the DiD estimation have, by construction, very different 
intensities of electricity and gas input usage: between 4% and 54% of total inputs for the treated 
                                                          
12 For a discussion on the pros and cons of each type of indicator, see Égert and Wanner (2016). 
13 Appendix A6 presents detailed information on the wide and narrow indicator for each sector and year. 
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and from 0% to 1% for the control.14 Table 3 shows that firms in treated sectors are more 
productive but are also smaller, both in terms of number of employees and output. By computing 
the t statistics for the null hypothesis that the means are equal in the two groups, we find that there 
are statistically significant differences for output, operational costs, cost of employees, lnTFP, and 
for the number of workers. 
Table 3 - Means of Key Variables 
 
Variable Unit Treated  Control ta 
Output 103 € 1,120 1,289 -0 
  (28) (70)  
Operational Costs 103 € 164 434 -0.03 
  (3) (10)  
Cost of Employees 103 € 118 195 -0.02 
  (2) (4)  
Assets 103 € 1,622 1,762 -0 
  (81) (48)  









Source: Author’s own calculations using IES data for the years 2004-2014. N= 1.373.056. 
a Test of equality of means in treated and control groups. 
 
4  Methodology 
We now briefly outline the methodology of each part of the paper.  
Firstly, we investigate the relationship between product market regulation in upstream sectors and 
firms’ performance in downstream ones. Our baseline equation is as follows:                 
∆𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑇𝐹𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1 + +𝛽3 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑘,𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝜓𝑖𝐷𝑖
4
𝑠=1 + 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡     
[2] 
                                                          
14 Details about the construction of treated and control groups available in Section 4. 
12 
 
Where ∆𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 is the growth of Total Factor Productivity for firm 𝑖 in sector 𝑘 at year 𝑡.
15 
∆𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑘,𝑡 stands for the productivity growth of the sectoral technological frontier within the 
sector 𝑘 at time 𝑡  and 𝐷𝑇𝐹𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1 denotes the distance of each firm to its sectoral frontier, which we 
include to control for spillovers from firms at the frontier, i.e., to assess whether more productive 
firms are spreading innovative features across the economy through so-called diffusion (or pass-
through) mechanisms and catching-up. 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑘,𝑡−1 , our regulatory variable, is an index that 
ranges from 0 (low impact of regulation in downstream sectors) to 1 (high impact).16 Hence, we 
expect a negative coefficient for this variable. Additionally, sectoral, time and region fixed effects 
are included (𝛼𝑘  , 𝛼𝑡  , 𝛼𝑟, respectively) to control for characteristics that are specific to the sector, 
year and region. Firm size controls are also included (∑ 𝜓𝑖𝐷𝑖
4
𝑠=1 ). All regressions use robust 
standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity.   
To assess the potential heterogeneous effects across firm productivity levels and sectors, we extend 
[2] by interacting the reform variable with a dummy, 𝐷𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡 (which is one for firms at the sectoral 
technological frontier and 0 otherwise), and separately for each sector (with and without the 
interaction variable).  
The impact on productivity may be driven by an intensive (i.e., changes in the TFP of firms in the 
market) or an extensive margin (i.e., exit of firms with lower TFP). We investigate this mechanism 
through the probit equation [3]: 
𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡  [3] 
Where 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 is equal to 1 when a firm exits the market and 0 otherwise, 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1 stands for 
the level of productivity, and 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1 is defined as in [2]. If reforms potentiate the exit 
                                                          
15 For more detailed information on how this variable is constructed, please refer to Section 4.2.  
16 The index may increase because the downstream sector relies more heavily on regulated upstream sectors or because upstream 
regulation is tightened. 
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of low productivity firms, the coefficient of the interaction term should be negative. The coefficient 
of 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1 is also expected to be negative, as a higher value represents a higher impact of 
regulation in upstream sectors. 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1 should also have a negative coefficient, because more 
productive firms are more likely to survive. We cluster standard errors at the sector level.  
Finally, we apply a difference in differences (DiD) approach to evaluate whether the firms in the 
downstream sectors that benefit the most from reforms (treated group) are more resilient to the 
2011 crisis. We expect their productivity levels to be less affected by the 2011 crisis, as compared 
to the control group (firms which are less affected by reforms). 
Given that, up to 2011, the most important reforms tackled electricity and gas (Figure 2), we focus 
on these two upstream sectors to create the treatment and control groups. The treated sectors use 
electricity and gas more intensively, i.e. belong to the 70th sectoral percentile, while the control 
sectors use them less intensely (30th sectoral percentile of gas and electricity usage).17 To build the 
sectoral intensities, we use the OECD input-output matrix for the Portuguese economy, between 
2004 and 2011. Importantly, we define the treated and control at the sectoral level, but we then 
implement a firm-level analysis. This is because we do not have firm-level data on the usage of 
these two inputs.18 
We thus estimate the following equation: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑇𝑘 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑘 ∗ 𝑆𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 [4] 
The dependent variable is the level of Total Factor Productivity; 𝑇𝑘  is the treatment dummy, i.e., 
it indicates firms in treated sectors; 𝑆𝑡  is time dummy that turns one from 2011 onwards, while 
                                                          
17 Treated group sectors (70th percentile): Electricity, gas and water supply; Other non-metallic mineral products; Mining and 
quarrying; Basic metals; Hotels and Restaurants; Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; Pulp, paper, paper products, printing 
and publishing and Rubber and plastics products; control group sectors (30th percentile): Post and telecommunications; Electrical 
machinery and apparatus, nec; R&D and other business activities; Construction; Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; 
Computer, Electronic and optical equipment; Renting of machinery and equipment and Coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel. 
18 Ideally, one would prefer to use firm-level intensities, but this information is not available in our firm-level database. 
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𝑇𝑘 ∗ 𝑆𝑡 is the DiD term, that we expect to have a positive coefficient, implying that the treated 
group reacts better to a negative shock, registering a lower decrease in TFP as compared to the 
control group.  
Figure 2 – Product market regulation in network industries in Portugal 
 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database for the years 2004-2013. 
 
5  Empirical Results and Robustness Checks 
5.1 Impact on Productivity  
We start by estimating [2] to analyse the effects of upstream regulation on firm productivity. The 
results, presented in Table 4, indicate the presence of short-run costs, as reforms are curbing 
productivity one year after their implementation. To assess the validity of our results, we conduct 
several robustness tests. In this regression, we replace our reform indicator with the narrow version. 
As argued by Égert and Wanner (2016), while the wide indicator is more suitable for cross-country 
or cross-sector studies, the narrow indicator is better suited for time-series analysis (as only the 
network indicator has an annual frequency).  Furthermore, we test the regression with Labour 






Table 4 - The Impact of Product Market Reforms  
Variable ΔTFP ΔTFP ΔLP 
ΔFrontier 0.99*** 0.99*** 4.45*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) 
DTF  0.6*** 0.6*** 0.51*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Regimpact (wide) 0.07*** - 0.08*** 
 (0.01)  (0.02) 
Regimpact (narrow) - 0.13** - 
  (0.07)  
Small Firm  0.16*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Medium Firm  0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 
 (0) (0) (0.01) 
Large Firm  0.43*** 0.43*** 0.52*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Sectoral Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Region Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Constant -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.8*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
N 1,680,539 1,680,539 1,846,810 
R2  36% 36% 35% 
 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Source: Author’s own computations using IES and OECD data for the years 2004-2014. 
 
 
It is thus important to understand if these costs are broad-based, affecting different firms and 
sectors equally, or if we face heterogeneous effects. 
5.2 Heterogenous Effects 
In this section, we explore heterogeneous effects across firms with different productivity and in 
different sectors. We start by extending equation [2] with an interaction variable (as described in 
the methodology section), and show that frontier firms are actually gaining from a less stringent 
regulatory framework in the intermediate sectors one year after the reforms, while laggards are 
losing (Table 5). However, productivity spillovers from frontier firms are positive, both in terms 
16 
 
of pass-through and catching-up, at least partially compensating for the negative direct effects on 
laggard firms.  These results may be explained by the fact that frontier firms are better equipped to 
deal with competitive pressures and to grasp the benefits of higher competition in upstream sectors, 
by using the additional profit margin to reduce prices. Laggards have more compressed profit 
margins and thus have less scope to do so. The results using the narrow indicator and using LP are 
qualitatively in line with our core estimations, proving that our results are robust. 
Table 5 - The Impact of Product Market Reforms  
Variable ΔTFP ΔTFP ΔLP 
ΔFrontier 1.08*** 1.08*** 5.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) 
DTF  0.65*** 0.65*** 0.59*** 
 
(0) (0) (0) 
Regimpact (wide) 0.14*** - 0.17*** 
 (0.01)  (0.02) 
Regimpact (narrow) - 0.32*** - 
  (0.06)  
DummyFrontier 0.86*** 0.78*** 1.23*** 
 
(0) (0) (0.01) 






DummyFrontier*Regimpact (narrow) - -0.94*** - 
  (0.02)  
Small Firm  0.15 0.15 0.10 
 
(0) (0) (0) 
Medium Firm  0.23 0.23 0.20 
 
(0) (0) (0.01) 
Large Firm  0.28 0.28 0.30 
 (0.11) (0.01) (0.02) 
Sectoral Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Region Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Constant -0.75*** -0.75*** -1.05*** 
 
(0) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 1,680,539 1,680,539 1,846,810 
R2  43% 43% 42% 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Source: Author’s own computations using IES and OECD data for the years 2004-2014. 
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We then estimate equation [2] by sector. Table 6 presents the main results for the different sectors. 
Table 6 - The Impact of Product Market Reforms - By Sector  
Variable 
N R2  
ΔTFP ΔFrontier  DTF  Regimpact 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1.75*** 0.52*** -1.03*** 64,059 41% 
Mining and quarrying -1.45*** 0.52*** 4.11*** 6,577 29% 
Food products, beverages and tobacco -4.01*** 0.53*** 1.86*** 50,122 36% 
Wood and products of wood and cork -2.91*** 0.54*** -0.30 23,500 29% 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing -0.84*** 0.5*** 3.13*** 21,024 50% 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 2.14 0.59*** 2.27 1,410 37% 
Chemicals and chemical products -1.66 0.4*** 4.22*** 3,813 21% 
Rubber and plastics products 1.66*** 0.5*** 2.05*** 8,092 31% 
Other non-metallic mineral products 4.25*** 0.43*** 5.4*** 22,910 22% 
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear -0.32*** 0.53*** 1.51*** 72,709 26% 
Basic metals -9.57*** 0.39*** -1.31 2,245 28% 
Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment -11.51*** 0.59*** -3.1*** 49,580 34% 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c -3.64*** 0.52*** 1.5*** 10,217 29% 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 4.92*** 0.48*** 5*** 3,705 29% 
Other transport equipment -4.30 0.62*** 2.14 1,292 43% 
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.54 0.57*** 0.49 2,906 51% 
Construction -5.37*** 0.74*** 5.53*** 302,312 42% 
Transport and storage -9.02*** 0.55*** -1.39*** 153,744 27% 
Post and telecommunications 0.35 0.72*** 2.49*** 2,009 50% 
Real estate activities -11.62*** 0.69*** -34.86*** 67,638 45% 
Office, accounting and computing machinery -1.93 0.06 -16.86 119 13% 
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 0.10 0.6*** 1.24 2,542 40% 
Radio, television and communication equipment 1.42 0.42*** -9.36 198 35% 
Medical, precision and optical instruments -0.06 0.64*** 0.00 6,677 40% 
Manufacturing n.e.c; recycling -5.76*** 0.56*** 2.83*** 21,758 32% 
Wholesale and retail trade, repairs -8.4*** 0.46*** 0.08*** 429,587 29% 
Hotels and restaurants -4.04*** 0.55*** -4.34*** 217,696 34% 
Renting of machinery and equipment -1.54*** 0.53*** 15.12*** 1,633 34% 
Computer and related activities -0.95** 0.63*** 5.15*** 30,667 40% 
Other Business Activities 12.26*** 0.59*** -10.87*** 95,321 34% 
Research and Development 10.87 0.58*** 69.81 1,770 41% 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Source: Author’s own computations using IES and OECD data for the years 2004-2014. 
 
We show that while some sectors are facing short-term costs, some others, namely Agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishing, Other Business Activities, Real estate activities, Hotels & 
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Restaurants, Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment, and Transport and 
storage, have increased productivity growth already one year after the reforms. The same 
regression using the narrow version of the reform indicator, using LP instead of TFP, and with the 
distinction of the effect on frontier and laggard firms, is available in tables A1 to A5 in the annexes. 
Overall, the results are qualitatively the same, with some exceptions for specific sectors. 
5.4 Improved Resource Allocation and Resilience 
We now provide evidence in favour of two possible mechanisms for the effects of upstream reforms 
on downstream TFP: a better resource allocation, potentiating the exit of lower productivity firms; 
and a more resilient economy, better equipped to deal with downturns.  
5.4.1 Improved Resource Allocation  
Figure 3 shows the changing pattern of firm entry and exit in the last decade. While up to 2008 the 
firms exiting the market had higher productivity than those entering, from 2009 the pattern was 
reversed. In this section we investigate whether this is related with product market reforms.  
 
 
Figure 3 – TFP by status of firm: incumbents, new and exit firms 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. using IES data for the years 2004-2014. N= 2.892.449 
By estimating a probit model on the probability of exiting the market (as defined in equation [3]), 
we show that low productivity firms are more prone to exit the market but that deregulation in 
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upstream sectors per se does not foster firm exit (Table 7); however, the coefficient of the 
interaction between productivity and the reform variable is negative, meaning that reforms are, as 
expected, increasing the exit rates for low productivity firms. Following the aforementioned 
procedure to test the robustness of our calculations, the same equation was estimated using the 
narrow version of the reform indicator, and using LP instead of TFP (Table 7). In spite of punctual 
differences for some variables that change signs, for our relevant variable, the interaction term, 
remains negative and significant for all type of regressions.   
Table 7 - Probability of Exiting (Probit) 
Pr(Exit) Coef Coef Coef 
Regimpact (wide) -0.14 - 4.59*** 
 (0.28)  (1.42) 
Regimpact (narrow) - 0.09 - 
  (0.15) 
 
lnTFP  -0.13** -0.14*** - 
 (0.04) (0.03) 
 
lnLP - - -0.11** 
   
(0.06) 
Regimpact (wide)*lnTFP  -0.2* - - 
 (0.11) 
  
Regimpact (narrow)*lnTFP  - -0.8*** - 
  (0.2) 
 
Regimpact (wide)*lnLP  - - -0.51*** 
   
(0.15) 
Constant -1.03** -1.04*** 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.5) 
N 1,678,664 1,678,664 1,847,730 
Pseudo R2 1% 2% 5% 
(Standard Errors adjusted for clusters in sector) 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Source: Author’s own computations using IES and OECD data for the years 2004-2014. 
In Figure 4 we report the marginal effect of the interaction variable varying TFP, with regulation 
set at its maximum and minimum, and varying regulation. In Panel 4A, we show that the lower the 
level of productivity, the higher the impact of regulation on the exit probability. Similarly, by 
comparing two firms with different productivity levels (Panel 4B), one highly productive and the 
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other less so, we again show that the difference between their exit probability is much higher in 
less rigid regulatory environments. 
Figure 4 – Predictive Margins 
Figure 4A – Predictive Margins (Fixing Regimpact) Figure 4B – Predictive Margins (Fixing lnTFP) 
  
Source: Author’s own calculations using IES and OECD data for the years 2004-2014 
 
5.4.2 Improved Resilience 
We now use a difference in differences estimation to assess if firms in sectors most affected by 
reforms (treated group) were better equipped to face the 2011 economic crisis, as suggested by the 
preliminary evidence in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 – Mean TFP levels for treated and control groups 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations using IES data for the years 2004-2014. N= 1,373,056. 
Note: This graph was produced by using Binscatter command in Stata. This procedure allows us to observe the average values 
by year and group for different periods of time, in this case, years.19 
                                                          




The results in Table 8 confirm that firms in treated sectors are more resilient to negative shocks 
when compared to the control group, i.e. in the face of the 2011 crisis their TFP decreased less. 
Ideally, we should have a placebo group, running the same DiD in a period with a crisis but no 
deregulation policies. Unfortunately, this is not possible, as our dataset only covers the period 
starting in 2004. In any case, to assess the robustness of the results, we compute the same regression 
without the electricity and gas sectors. These sectors could potentially bias our results, as they were 
directly affected by the reforms (on top of the usual downstream effects affecting all sectors). The 
results remain unchanged, as we continue to see more resilience in the treated group. The same 
procedure when applied using LP in Table 9, however, displays a statistically insignificant 
coefficient.  
Table 8 - Difference in Differences Estimation Results 
lnTFP Complete Without Electicity and Gas Sectors 
Time -0.12*** -0.12*** 
  (0) (0) 
Treated 0.29** 0.29** 
  (0.11) (0.11) 
DiD 0.04** 0.04** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Cons 1.31*** 1.31*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Controls YES YES 
N 1,373,056 1,373,056 
R2 3% 3% 
 
Table 9 - Difference in Differences Estimation Results 
lnLP Complete 
Time -0.29*** 
  (0.01) 
Treated 0.12 
  (0.2) 
DiD 0.11*** 
  (0.02) 
Cons 10.6*** 





(Standard Errors adjusted for clusters in sector) 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 







6  Conclusion 
In recent years, Portugal implemented a large number of structural reforms. Quantitative 
information on their effects in the economy is crucial for policy makers, as it allows fine-tuning 
past reform efforts and better design future reforms. Taking stock of what was achieved so far is 
crucial to define the way forward.  
In this study we focus on the effects of product market reforms, given their relevance in the 
Portuguese reform agenda in recent years, their large potential pay-offs and the usual resistance to 
reform, particularly acute in this area (with concentrated costs and diffuse benefits). In particular, 
we assess the short-run effects of product market reforms in upstream sectors on the firm-level 
productivity of downstream sectors, evaluating also the impact on the allocation of resources and 
on the resilience to adverse shocks. Short-term effects are particularly relevant given their role on 
the political economy of the process.  
Relying on firm-level data for Portugal, covering the period between 2004 and 2014, we show that 
the short-run impact of reform on firm-level productivity is positive for the most productive firms 
(those belonging to the sectoral technological frontier), who are able to leverage on the increase 
competitiveness in the upstream sectors. 20 But the impact is negative for the other, less productive 
firms. Indeed, we show that the exit of the least productive is potentiated by the reform process. 
Still, for those that stay, there are second round effects from the gains at the frontier, as we find 
evidence of positive pass-through and catching-up mechanisms. In addition, our results corroborate 
existing studies that show that effects across sectors are differentiated: while some sectors are 
benefiting from upstream deregulation already after one year, some others see their productivity 
growth curbed. Finally, we find evidence that reforms increase firms’ resilience to negative shocks.  
                                                          
20 We assess the effects of the reforms implemented up to 2013. Reform efforts in more recent years can only be evaluated when 
more data becomes available. 
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Going forward, it would be important to enrich our results in a number of ways.  
The results provide a partial picture of the effects of the reforms, as they focus solely on the short-
run. We opted for this time horizon because some of the reforms are very recent and our available 
time-series is not very long. In any case, our assessment of the increased resilience to adverse 
shocks already points to these positive long-term effects. As more data becomes available, it will 
be possible to evaluate the longer-term effects of reforms on firms’ productivity.  
In addition, it would be informative to better understand the causes of the short-term costs. 
Following the literature, we could enlarge our analysis by accounting for the effect of the cycle. A 
preliminary attempt with the existing data shows that the effects of reforms before the financial 
and economic crisis are positive and only become negative during the downturn. However, a robust 
assessment would need to rely on a longer time-series. We could also explore the role of the initial 
framework conditions and the interactions with other reform areas as existing literature highlights 
their relevance, in particular in the short-run.  
Finally, and while Total Factor Productivity is a key determinant of growth, it is also important to 
assess the impact of product market reforms on labour utilisation and in particular on employment. 
Equity considerations are also of key importance. 
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